Riyadh Agreement Stc

CAIRO (Reuters) – South Yemeni separatists have suspended their participation in consultations on a power-sharing agreement for the south, known as the “Riyadh agreement,” he said in a statement from the Southern Transitional Council (STC) on Tuesday. While these steps to implement the Riyadh agreement are remarkable progress, it is not yet certain whether they will help bridge the long-term gaps between the two sides or deter parties on both sides from undermining the agreement. A more transparent debate on the militarization of the South and the responsibility for its protection, as well as a rigorous dialogue process that would take place at the local level, far from the agendas of political parties and regional ambitions, are necessary for the Riyadh agreement to make a real lasting difference and prevent the fragmentation of the country. He believes that “the implementation of the Riyadh agreement has become an inevitable necessity for both sides, and the remaining time for its implementation, in accordance with the mechanism announced on July 29, will reveal the seriousness of the STC in implementing the security and military part of the agreement.” Muwadea added: “The agreement limits President Hadi`s powers, as any appointment decisions he makes would require Saudi Arabia`s approval.” The STC delegation has officially informed Saudi Arabia of its intention to leave Riyadh and accuses the Yemeni government of obstructing the implementation of the agreement and delaying the formation of a new government, the Aden24 website reported. Al Jazeera discusses some of the key features of the agreement below. When the initial agreement was signed in November, observers feared that its vague language would complicate implementation, and these fears were quickly identified. The process stopped at the end of 2019 and until 2020, the TCT reportedly withdrew from the implementation committees in January. Subsequently, the Hadi government banned a delegation of STC officials from returning to Aden in March, and the STC followed suit by blocking the return of Hadi`s prime minister, Maeen Abdulmalik Saeed. Opponents of the STC often reduce the group to a mere alternate from the UAE, which continues to fund and support some of its political operations, but this does not refer to the popular support the STC has in its communities. The Hadi government and loyalist supporters continue to ignore protests in the southern region to support the STC and overplay those who support Hadi. Much of this propaganda undermines the prospects for a genuine implementation of an agreement. Moreover, the updating of the STC does not bode well for Yemen, as it deepens political marginalization.

In addition, the Hadi government cannot demand the demilitarization of the armed forces allied to stC, as it is not able to protect the South from Houthi military attacks. . . .